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Background
While password based schemes are prevalent forms of authentication, as the number 
and complexity of passwords continue to grow due to the increasing number of online 
accounts per user and complicated password creation policies, users are finding it 
increasingly difficult to manage and remember passwords for different accounts, and 
have to reset passwords frequently [1, 2]. To address this, prior efforts investigated vari-
ous forms of fallback authentication mechanisms to facilitate resetting of passwords. 
Among these, pre-selected challenge questions (i.e., personal knowledge questions) are 
often used as a fallback authentication mechanism to facilitate resetting/recovery of 
passwords [3]. However, this widely used approach of leveraging static challenge ques-
tions as fallback authentication mechanism has several limitations. For instance, recent 
studies revealed that personal knowledge based questions are often susceptible to 
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various weaknesses such as easy predictability, inapplicability, and poor recall rate  [3–
8]. Furthermore, static security questions are becoming weaker due to improved infor-
mation retrieval techniques and increases in online content [8], where an attacker can 
obtain the answers to many of the static challenge questions by mining online sources 
(e.g., social networking sites, public records or even a simple Google search).
To address the limitations of static security questions, recently, smartphone based 
autobiographical authentication mechanisms have been explored where challenge ques-
tions are not predetermined and generated dynamically based on users’ day-to-day 
activities captured by smartphones. Specifically, the constantly changing information 
about the daily behavior (e.g., phone calls, location traces) of a person is used to generate 
one-time authentication questions (e.g., Who did you call around 4:30 pm today?, What 
apps did you use in the last 24 h?).
Such dynamic security questions have several potential advantages over static challenge 
questions. For instance, as dynamic security questions are generated on the fly, users do 
not have to configure these questions in advance. Also, while certain static security ques-
tions are often not applicable for some users (e.g., What is the name of your first pet?), or 
may be easily found by looking at someone’s Facebook or LinkedIn profile (e.g., “What 
year did you graduate from college?”), dynamic security questions are likely to be harder 
to guess by mining online sources due to the randomness of a person’s smartphone usage 
behavior and day-to-day activities. While a limited number of prior efforts looked into 
the possibility of using dynamic security questions for fallback authentication, they only 
looked at a limited number of question types [9–11], making it hard to judge the strengths 
and weaknesses of this approach considering different kinds of users, question types, and 
answer selection schemes (e.g., open-ended vs. multiple choice).
To complement these prior efforts and examine the effect of different types of security 
questions on different categories of users’ recall/guessability performance (e.g., legiti-
mate user, adversarial users), this paper explores the design space of dynamic security 
questions that are generated using users’ day-to-day activities captured by smartphones. 
Specifically, we evaluate the recall rate and guessability rate for different question types 
for different kinds of adversarial users (e.g., naive vs. knowledgeable) through a field 
study over a period of 30 days with 24 participants who were recruited in pairs to simu-
late different kinds of adversaries (e.g., close friends, significant others). Over the course 
of the study, each participant was periodically presented with three sets of challenge 
questions. The first set of question was generated based on participant’s own data. The 
second set of question was generated based on participant’s pair’s (e.g., close friend or 
couple) data. In this case, the role of strong adversary is played by the pair of each par-
ticipant. Finally, the third set of question was generated based on a randomly selected 
participant’s data. In this case, participants played the role of naive adversary.
Over the course of the study, we collected a total of 7672 responses for seven different 
question types. Subsequently, we analyzed the response accuracy for different types of 
questions to gain insight regarding how they are perceived by users (e.g., easy to remem-
ber, hard to guess). Our findings suggest that the type of questions (e.g., communication 
event, location) and the style of questions (e.g., multiple choice, open ended) have a sig-
nificant impact on both legitimate and adversarial users’ response accuracies. Finally, as 
performance and response patterns of individual users can vary significantly for different 
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question types, we investigate and present a Bayesian classifier based authentication 
algorithm that can authenticate legitimate users with high accuracy by leveraging indi-
vidual response patterns while reducing the success rate of adversaries.
To summarize, this paper makes the following key contributions:
1. First, we present the first study that compares the usability of seven different dynamic 
security question types, namely, call, SMS, location, application usage, music, physi-
cal activity, and battery charging events, which are generated based on users’ smart-
phone usage behavior and day-to-day activities captured by smartphones.
2. Second, we conduct a field study that investigates the strengths and weaknesses of 
the presented schemes against different kinds of adversarial users (e.g., naive vs. 
knowledgeable) for different categories of questions.
3. Finally, we discuss the usability aspects of such systems based on qualitative feedback 
collected using an exit survey.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. "Related work" section presents a summary 
of prior work. "Methods" section explains the study design and describes the algorithms 
for question generation and score calculations. "Evaluation" section presents the results 
from our experimentation with real users. Insights gained in this work along with limi-
tations of our study and future directions of our work are discussed in "Discussion and 
limitations of the study" section. Finally, "Conclusion" section concludes the paper.
Related work
Prior efforts investigated various forms of fallback authentication mechanisms to facili-
tate resetting of passwords or to provide an extra layer of security for authentication. 
The most widely known fallback authentication mechanism is based on challenge ques-
tions (a.k.a, security questions) where a service (e.g., website) requires a user to answer 
personal verification questions such as “what is the name of your first pet?”. However, 
the use of such pre-agreed personal authentication questions has been widely criticized 
and considered to be a weak form of authentication [3–5, 7, 8, 12] due to various vulner-
abilities. For example, Zviran and Haga [13] conducted a study in which they found that 
participants were able to remember 78 % of their answers to a set of personal security 
questions, and those who are close to the participants (e.g., spouses, close friends) were 
able to guess the answers correctly 33 % of the time. In line with this, Podd et  al. in 
1996 [14] conducted a similar study and reported a similar recall rate (80 %) for legiti-
mate users and higher guessability from attackers (39.5 %). Both studies reported that 
participants forget 20–22 % of their answers within three months. Schechter et al.  [7] 
conducted a user study where they evaluated the challenge questions used by four large 
webmail providers and they pointed out that 20 % of the participants forget their own 
answers within 6 months. 17 % of their answers was guessed correctly by acquaintances 
with whom participants were unwilling to share their webmail passwords. 13 % of the 
answers could be guessed within five attempts by guessing the most popular answers of 
other participants. More recently, Bonneau et al. [4] analyzed a real-world data set on 
security questions of millions of Google account holders and they found that a signifi-
cant fraction of users (40 %) were unable to recall their answers when needed. Also, they 
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pointed out that questions that are more memorable such as city of birth and father’s 
middle name are also the easiest to find from the public records or social networking 
sites, while potentially safest questions suffer from low recall rate (e.g., frequent flyer 
number only has a 9 % recall rate). In another study, Rabkin  [8] identified that secu-
rity questions are getting weaker due to improved information retrieval techniques and 
increases in online content. By mining online sources (e.g., social networking sites, pub-
lic records and search engines), an attacker can obtain the details about one’s personal 
information to answer many of the challenge questions commonly used for fallback 
authentication. For example, the answer to the question “What year did you graduate 
from college?” may be found from one’s Facebook profile or LinkedIn profile. Rabkin [8] 
found that 16 % of the questions had answers publicly available in online social network-
ing sites. Moreover, as many of the challenge questions are often used across different 
websites, the consequences of compromising a single account can be overwhelming.
To address the limitations of static challenge question based schemes, several new 
approaches have been investigated where challenge questions are not predetermined 
and are dynamically generated on the fly based on user’s recent activities such as online 
browsing history [15, 16], Facebook activity [17], electronic personal history (e.g., per-
sonal calendar data) [18, 19], email history [20], and users’ recent location history [21, 
22]. Among works that looked into leveraging smartphone usage data and behavior 
data, Das et  al. [9] proposed to generate authentication questions from users’ day-to-
day activities captured by their smartphones. However, the authors did not evaluate this 
scheme against various attackers in real-life (e.g., close friends). Hang et  al.  [10] pre-
sented the design of dynamic security questions generated based on smartphone usage 
data (e.g., call and SMS histories, app usage). Along this line, we investigated location-
based dynamic challenge question generation schemes where different types of ques-
tions are generated based on users’ locations tracked by smartphones and presented to 
users for fallback authentication [22].
While several works have investigated the possibility of using dynamic security ques-
tions for authentication, only a handful of them looked into the aspect of memorability. 
Among these, recently, Gupta et  al.  [23] investigated the memorability of smartphone 
usage behavior (e.g., calls, texts, emails) and attempted to leverage that to authenticate 
users. One of the main limitations of this work is that the challenge questions are gener-
ated based on a user’s routine (e.g., who do you call the most?) rather than day-to-day 
activities which are more dynamic and is the focus of our work. In another work, Hang 
et al. [24] proposed a fallback authentication system where users are asked to remember 
the arrangements of icons on home screen. However, accurately remembering the icon 
arrangement on home screen can be difficult for users, since some apps can change the 
arrangement of home screen icons (e.g., after uninstalling/installing an app), which hin-
ders the usability of such systems. More recently, Hang et al.  [11] presented a fallback 
authentication mechanism where users are asked to recognize apps that are installed or 
not installed on their smartphones.
While these and our own exploratory studies [25, 21, 22] present interesting results, no 
comprehensive study has been done so far that looked into the strengths and weaknesses 
of such systems considering different kinds of users, question types, and answer selec-
tion schemes (e.g., open-ended vs. multiple choice). Towards that, our work presented 
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in this paper complements these prior efforts that investigated the challenge of design-
ing dynamic security questions using users’ smartphone usage behavior data for fallback 
authentication, and extends prior efforts in several ways as follows. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, we are the first to explore several new data types (e.g., Music play-list 
history, Physical activity, Battery charging events) and answer types (e.g., multiple choice 
vs. open ended, time selection) for generating dynamic security questions for fallback 
authentication. Second, we conducted a real life study in which we evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of dynamic security questions for different categories of questions and 
user types (e.g., legitimate, naive adversary, strong adversary). Finally, we attempt to 
understand users’ perceptions regarding dynamic security questions through an inter-
view style exit survey. The details of our work are presented in the following sections.
Methods
In this section, we first describe the smartphone application that was developed to col-
lect and analyze autobiographical data. We then present the algorithms for question 
generation and score calculations. Finally, we present the design of the study. The details 
are below.
Data collection
We developed an Android application that supports devices running Android 2.3 or 
higher to collect autobiographical user data, and then analyzes the collected data to gen-
erate challenge questions. Table 1 lists the details regarding the data that are collected in 
our study.
The communication data (call, SMS) was obtained from the recent communica-
tion history. The app usage data is estimated based on how long an app is in the fore-
ground while the smartphone screen is on. Music playlist history was obtained through 
the broadcast event of music player (e.g., default music player, Spotify). Battery charg-
ing events were collected when the smartphone was connected to a power source (e.g., 
AC, USB). Physical activity of users was obtained using the Android activity recognition 
API [26] which provides an easy way to recognize five different types of user activities 
(e.g., riding in a vehicle, riding a bicycle, walking, running, and no movement). In order 
to obtain the location information with minimal energy overhead, we utilize the lat-
est Google Fused Location API [27] along with Android’s activity recognition API [26]. 
Specifically, the application leverages the Android’s activity recognition API to decide 
Table 1 Details of the collected data
Data Details of collected data
Call Type (outgoing, incoming), duration, name of the person, time
SMS Type (sent, received), receiver/sender name, length of SMS message, time
App usage App name, package name, duration, time
Music Track name, artist, album, duration, time
Physical activity Type (walking, running, in vehicle, on bicycle), confidence level, duration, time
Battery charging Type of power connection (AC, USB), duration, time
Location Latitude, longitude, duration, time, accuracy (i.e., the expected error bound)
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whether to track location or not. For example, when a user is not moving, the app does 
not track location at all. On the other hand, if a user is detected to be walking, biking, or 
riding in a vehicle, the app starts logging location data.
Once the data items are collected, the question generation component generates chal-
lenge questions as follows.
Autobiographical question generation
Using the aforementioned data types, the application generates nine different types of 
questions as listed in Table 2. Please note that we only use data from the last 24 h to 
generate questions. This is based on the prior work which showed that users can recall a 
good number of many episodic memories that are one day old compared to events that 
are older [28]. Details about each type of questions are below.
Questions generated based on communications activity
Communication questions are generated based on a user’s recent communication his-
tory (e.g., SMS history that includes both sent and received messages, and call history 
that includes both incoming and outgoing phone calls). This category of questions asks 
a user to recall the name of the person he/she called or SMS messaged, or the name of 
the person who called him/her or SMS messaged him/her at a certain time. Examples 
of communication questions are shown in Fig.  1a, b. For this type of question, a user is 
asked to enter the answer (i.e., person’s name) into a textbox. To enhance the usability, 
we utilize the “auto-complete” feature which suggests possible entries as a user types 
in the textbox. This is especially helpful as “auto-complete” feature reduces potential 
errors due to possible misspellings and speeds up the process, especially when entering 
a long text (e.g., long name and last name of a person). As an attacker may take advan-
tage of this feature (i.e., “auto-complete”), especially if a user has a very limited number 
of contacts (i.e., limited answer space), the application inserts random names which are 
derived from an online fake name generator [29]. Inserting fake names in addition to 
users’ contact list names increases the answer space significantly, making it harder to 
guess the correct answer, which is also reflected in the exit survey.
Table 2 List of question types generated by the application
Question type Question Retrieval type
Call Who called you on <time> ?
Who did you call on <time> ?
Recall
SMS Who SMS messaged you on <time> ?
Who did you SMS message on <time> ?
Recall
Location Where were you on <time> ? Recall
Application What are the applications you used in the last 24 h? Recognize
Music What are the music you listened to in the last 24 h? Recognize
Activity What activities did you perform in the last 24 h and when? Recognize and recall
Battery When did you charge your phone in the last 24 h and how  
was it charged?
Recognize and recall
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Questions generated based on application usage data
Application usage questions are generated based on a user’s recent app usage history. 
This type of question is a recognition question in which a user is presented with 15 
options and asked to identify the applications that he/she used within the last 24 hours. 
Options are presented along with icons of the applications to facilitate recall. An exam-
ple app question is shown in Fig. 1c. The presented 15 options contain multiple correct 
answers along with multiple incorrect answers (i.e., distractors). In particular, a random 
number of correct answers are sampled from the user’s recent app usage history by using 
the algorithm, which is explained in   "Algorithm for generating challenge questions" 
section. Also, when sampling the correct answers, we avoided selecting apps that are 
preinstalled by operating system such as home screen and launcher apps (e.g., “Touch-
Wiz home launcher”). This was done for two reasons. First, these apps are commonly 
pre-installed by manufacturers of devices without the knowledge of users [11], thus 
these apps are often not seen as being apps by users [30]. Second, these apps (e.g., home 
launcher) may be too obvious for an adversary to guess. A random number of plausible 
incorrect answers are compiled based on the user’s past app usage history that are not 
Fig. 1 Screenshots showing different types of questions. a Call, b SMS, c App, d Music e Activity, f Battery 
and g Location
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used recently. Other distractors are derived from the top downloaded apps in Google 
Play Store [31]. In this paper, we present 15 options to make the answer sufficiently hard 
to guess [21].
Questions generated based on music data
Questions about music are generated based on a user’s recent music playlist history 
which contains the log of the music a user has played. Similar to app questions, this type 
of question is a recognition question in which a user is presented with 15 options and 
is asked to identify the music that he/she played within the last 24 h. The presented list 
may contain multiple correct answers along with multiple incorrect answers (i.e., dis-
tractors). A random number of correct answers are sampled from the user’s recent music 
playlist history by using the algorithm presented in "Algorithm for generating challenge 
questions" section. A random number of plausible incorrect answers are compiled based 
on the user’s past music playlist history that have not been played recently. Other dis-
tractors are derived from the top tracks in Spotify by using Spotify Web API [32]. Fur-
thermore, this API provides a wide range of genre categories along with search criteria, 
which allows us to select distractors based on track genres, artists, and albums. Options 
are presented with album cover art along with 30 s audio previews of tracks using the 
Spotify Web API [32]. When a play button is tapped, 30 s of audio from the correspond-
ing track starts playing (see Fig.  1d). The use of icons and audio previews provides a 
more appealing and simpler interface for the user. Moreover, it facilitates recall for users 
by providing auditory and visual cues (e.g., album thumbnails). An example of a music 
question is shown in Fig. 1d.
Questions generated based on physical activity log
Questions about physical activities are generated based on the log that records the phys-
ical activities of a user. In this question type, a user is asked to: (1) identify all the physi-
cal activities that he/she performed longer than a specified threshold (e.g., 3 min) within 
the last 24 h and (2) select the time window for the selected activity by using the time 
slider. An example physical activity question can be seen in Fig. 1e. Note that this type of 
question can have multiple correct answers (i.e., multiple different physical activities can 
be performed during a day). For instance, if a user was in a vehicle twice during a day, 
the user can pick a time for any of these activities (i.e., in vehicle activity).
Questions generated based on battery charging events
Questions that are generated based on recent battery charging events ask a user to iden-
tify: (1) the time when the device was plugged into a power source (i.e., charger) within 
the last 24 h and (2) the mode of charging (e.g., AC charger, USB) (see Fig. 1f ). As in the 
physical activity question, this type of question can have multiple correct answers as well 
(i.e., a device may be charged multiple times during a day). In case of multiple correct 
answers, a user needs to pick only one of them.
Questions generated based on location information
Location questions are generated based on a user’s recent location traces tracked by the 
application. The collected location data is composed of a sequence of coordinates with 
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latitude, longitude and the relevant temporal information (i.e., time stamp). To avoid 
considering each geographical coordinate as a unique physical location, in our work, 
we use a clustering algorithm that groups geographical coordinates based on their dis-
tance in order to infer user’s locations. However, as a user may visit new places over 
time and we do not know a priori the total number of places a user may visit, we chose 
to use a density-based clustering approach that can incrementally adapts the number 
of clusters (i.e., the number of distinct physical locations). Specifically, we employ the 
DBSCAN (density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise) algorithm [33] 
that is based on the notion of density reachability. Briefly, the DBSCAN algorithm 
requires two parameters: ǫ distance threshold (e.g., 75 m) and minpts minimum number 
of points within a cluster. The algorithm starts by assigning a random point in a cluster 
and expands it with neighborhoods of at least minpts points that are within a distance ǫ 
from it. In our work, to calculate the distance between two geographical coordinates, we 
use Haversine distance [34], though the algorithm can work with any distance function. 
Based on the distance of examined coordinates and ǫ distance threshold, the DBSCAN 
algorithm either creates new clusters or expands/updates the existing clusters. As new 
coordinates arrive, new coordinates are first examined to determine whether they can 
be assigned to any of the existing clusters. If not, the new coordinates are given as input 
to the DBSCAN algorithm to regenerate the clusters including the new locations. The 
output of this algorithm is a set of clusters that is used to generate questions. Please note 
that this algorithm only runs whenever the application needs to generate location ques-
tions for a user. For location-based questions, a user is presented an interactive map and 
is asked to select the location that he/she had visited during a certain time window of a 
specific day (see Fig. 1g). The interactive map was implemented leveraging the Google 
Maps Android API [35] where the initial zoom level was set to one to make the most of 
the world visible. The rationale behind this choice is to avoid influencing users to select 
locations from a certain geographic area, which may reduce the overall security of the 
system [36]. In order to select a location on the map, the minimum required zoom level 
is set to 16, which gives reasonable details and higher security since an adversary has 
to guess a location at a finer resolution. A user needs to long press on the map to pin 
his/her location and set a marker at the selected location (e.g., like the one in Fig. 1g). 
Instead of zooming in/out manually, user may also use a search box implemented using 
Google Place Autocomplete feature to zoom-in on the right area/location very quickly.
Algorithm for generating challenge questions
As there can be hundreds of events per day (e.g., phone call events, SMS messages), it is 
nontrivial to pick the specific instance of an event that may be used to generate the ques-
tion. Ideally, the system should pick an event that is easy for a legitimate user to recall 
but hard for an adversary to guess.
To address this challenge, we develop an algorithm that gives preference to rare events 
compared to more predictable events. Intuitively, if a person rarely receives a phone call 
from person X, it is more likely that he/she will remember that event. This intuition is 
also supported by prior work in psychology. For instance, Kristo et al. [37] reported that 
events that occur less frequently are remembered better compared to events that occur 
frequently.
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To implement the algorithm, we represent a user’s history H as a sequence of events 
(e.g., phone call). In H, each event is represented as a triplet of the form ei = (ai, di, ti), 
where ai represents an activity (e.g., making a phone call), di is the duration of this activ-
ity and ti is the time-stamp of the event. Assuming that n activities were recorded for a 
user in a given time frame, the history for that time frame will be represented as a time 
ordered sequence of triplets, and will be denoted as H = {e1, ..., en}. Subsequently, we 
convert the history H into a time window-activity matrix as shown in Table 3 by split-
ting each day into a set of m time windows W = {w0, ...,wm} of fixed size (e.g., 1 h). Next, 
each event is assigned to a specific time windows Wi based on the event’s time-stamp ti.
Once events are assigned in specific time windows, the system computes an “interest-
ingness” weight for each event based on statistical measure of randomness, and attempts 
to pick events for generating questions by giving preference to more infrequent events 
in a user’s schedule. To identify the infrequent events for a given Time window-location 
matrix (e.g., as shown in Table 3), the algorithm analyzes daily and weekly activity pat-
terns of a user and calculates the weight for an event as follows.
1. First, the algorithm calculates P(ei) which denotes the probability of an event ei. For 
example, probability of calling John in the last 30 days based on call log data.
2. Next, the algorithm calculates P(ei|wm) which denotes the probability of event ei 
for a specific time interval wm. For example, the probability of calling John between 
10:00 am and 11:00 am in the last 30 days. This probability is calculated to identify 
daily patterns.
3. Next, the algorithm calculates P(ei|wm, dowk) where dowk denotes the “day of the week” 
from the set DOW = {dow1, ..., dow7} where dow1 = Monday, . . . , dow7 = Sunday . 
P(ei|wm, dowk) denotes the probability of an event ei for a time interval wm on day 
dowk of the week. For example, the probability of calling John between 10:00 am and 
11:00 am on Mondays in the last 30 days. This probability is calculated to identify 
weekly patterns.
4. Finally, to give priority to long lasting events which are more likely to be remembered 
by a user easily, the algorithm calculates Tie which denotes the sum of the duration of 
event ei in the history H and subsequently, multiply with di (duration of the event). 
Table 3 Time window-event matrix of a user’s phone call log history
Numbers right next to a person’s name indicates the duration of the phone calls in seconds
Window\day Nov 14 Nov 15 . . . Dec 27
00 : 00− 00 : 59 – – . . . {Receivedcallfrom− Jeff , 55s}






















14 : 00− 14 : 59 {Called − Alice, 55 s},
{Called − Bob, 32 s}
{Called − Bob, 89 s} . . . {Called − Bob, 17 s}
15 : 00− 15 : 59 {Called − John, 300 s} {Receivedcallfrom− Jeff , 42 s} . . . –
16 : 00− 16 : 59 {Called − John, 14 s} {Called − Bob, 20 s} . . . {Called − Bob, 89 s}






















23 : 00− 23 : 59 – {Receivedcall − Bob, 14 s} . . . {Called −Mike, 14 s}
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For example, multiply a recent phone call duration made to John with the sum of the 
duration of phone calls that made to John in the last 30 days based on call log data. 
The main intuition behind this multiplication is that we want to give priority to the 
latest events that lasted longer compared to other events of the same type.





 Once weight for individual events are calculated, the algorithm sorts all events based 
on weight and picks according to that order whenever the system needs to generate 
challenge questions for a particular data type. Please note that the lower the weight, 
the higher the chance of that event to be selected by the algorithm.
Due to the above scheme, higher weight questions that are relatively easy to guess 
because of “regularity” are filtered out and the preference is given to more infrequent 
events which are more likely to be harder to guess but easier to recall by legitimate users. 
Please note that the above scheme can be applied for any data types such as call log, 
SMS log, and location log. However, necessary changes may need to be made based on 
data types. For instance, for SMS log, there is no duration for SMS messages, and thus 
duration needs to be ignored or may be replaced with the length of SMS messages. For 
location log, to avoid considering each geographical coordinate as a unique physical 
location, geographical coordinates are clustered first.
User score calculation
To be able to authenticate users based on their response accuracy, we need to calculate 
the score of a user for a given session where multiple different questions may be asked 
for authentication. However, as users may make different kinds of mistakes for different 
question types while answering the challenge questions, we need to calculate the score 
differently for different question types. Table 4 lists the question formats and the mecha-
nisms that were used to calculate scores for different question types. We describe how 
scores are calculated for different types of questions below.
Score calculation for communication questions
In the case of communication questions (i.e., Call and SMS), a user can either pick the 
answer from a list of suggestions that are populated using an “auto-complete” function-
ality, or a user may type in his/her answer instead of selecting from the list of names sug-
gested by the “auto-complete” feature. However, while typing, a user may make spelling 
mistakes. For example, a common first name “Adrianna” may be spelled as “Adrianne” 
or “Adrienne”. Thus, instead of scoring the answer based on an exact match (where the 
correct answer and the user’s answer are matched 100 %), in the current implementa-
tion, there is an error tolerance to accommodate typing errors (e.g., 85 % similarity score 
between two strings). Specifically, if the Jaro-Winkler distance [38] between the entered 
text and the correct answer has a similarity score greater than 85 %, the answer is con-
sidered to be correct. Otherwise, the score is set to 0. Please note that the Jaro-Winkler 
distance metric is considered to be well-suited for comparing short strings such as per-
son names [38].
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Score calculation for location questions
For location questions, as users may not place the marker on exactly the same location 
coordinates estimated and identified by the system, there is an error tolerance (e.g., 75 m 
great circle distance) in our system, which is calculated based on the Haversine distance 
formula [34] between the selected coordinates and the estimated location. Specifically, 
if the distance between the selected geographical location and the estimated location 
is greater than 75 m, the answer is considered to be incorrect and the score is set to 
0. Please note that this threshold (75 m) has been identified based on prior work [22], 
where it was shown to be useful to distinguish between legitimate and adversarial users.
Score calculation for app usage and music questions
In the case of questions about application usage and questions about the music played, 
a user is presented with 15 options where he/she can choose multiple answers from the 
given set of options. We develop a simple mechanism based on the methods in [39] to 
calculate a partial score for a particular question. Specifically, a user receives points if he/
she correctly selects an answer, but if the user picks an incorrect answer, he/she is penal-
ized (i.e., receives negative points). Please note that due to the penalization scheme, a 
user may receive a negative score, which may happen if he/she selects more incorrect 
options than correct options.















Table 4 List of question types along with their corresponding question format, score cal-
culation and existence of distractors
Question type Question format Score calculation Distractors
Call Open-ended Jaro-Winkler [38]
see "Score calculation for communication 
questions" section
✗
SMS Open-ended Jaro-Winkler [38]
see "Score calculation for communication 
questions" section
✗
Location Open-ended Haversine [34]
see "Score calculation for location ques-
tions" section
✗
Application Multiple-choice Eq. 1
see "Score calculation for app usage and 
music questions" section
✓
Music Multiple-choice Eq. 1
see "Score calculation for app usage and 
music questions" section
✓
Activity Multiple-choice and time  
selection
Eq. 2
see "Score calculation for activity and bat-
tery charging questions" section
✗
Battery Multiple-choice and time  
selection
Eq. 2
see "Score calculation for activity and bat-
tery charging questions" section
✗
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where
  • nq: the number of options that are correct for a question q.
  • nqac: number of selected options for which the answer is correct for question q.
  • nqaw: number of selected options for which the answer is wrong for question q.
  • sp: severity of penalty is a parameter that controls the points deducted/subtracted for 
an incorrect answer.
In Eq. 1, sp is a parameter that controls how many points are deducted for an incorrect 
answer. The lower the sp, the higher the penalty for an incorrect answer. In our imple-
mentation, we chose sp = 1, which indicates that the penalty for an incorrect answer is 
equal to the points for a correct answer. Hence, positive score indicates more correct 
answers than incorrect answers, while negative score implies the opposite. The rationale 
behind this score calculation scheme is to: (1) prevent statistical guessing attacks where 
someone can simply select all possible answers to get the question correct (i.e., random 
guesser), and (2) allow users to get partial scores when they make a small number of mis-
takes (e.g., one correct app is ignored). For example, consider an app usage question that 
has 15 options, and 4 out of 15 options are correct. In this case, if a user selects 5 options 
where 4 of them is correct, 1 of them is incorrect and we choose sp = 1, the score for 




) = 0.75. If a user selects 4 options where 1 of them is cor-




) = −0.5. Note that in 
the first example, the user is slightly penalized (score = 0.75), losing one of his/her cor-
rect answers though he/she selected all four correct answers. On the other hand, in the 
second example, the user is severely penalized and gets negative score (score = −0.5) 
due to selecting more incorrect answers than correct answers.
Please note that we use the same formula (i.e., Eq.  1) to compute scores for music 
questions.
Score calculation for activity and battery charging questions
In the case of physical activity and battery charging questions, users are asked to select 
the correct events and the time for the selected events. As the answer consists of two 
parts, we calculate the score by giving different weights for each part of the answer (e.g., 
event type and the time of the event) as shown in Eqs.  2 and 3. Intuitively, as guess-
ing the correct time of an event is more likely to be harder than guessing the type of 
the event, we give higher weight to the time component of the answer compared to the 
event component where a user selects the type of the event. Specifically, we set wt > wo 
in Eq. 3 so that precisely answering the time component of an answer contributes more 
to the score compared to the event type of the answer. Furthermore, as a user may not 
be able to specify the exact time of the event, we use a maximum allowed time tmax and 
a minimum allowed time tmin threshold to award or penalize points depending on how 
“close” the answer is to the correct answer. Specifically, we consider three scenarios as 
shown in Eq. 4: (1) if the difference between a user’s answer and the true time is beyond 
tmax (e.g., 2 h), the user receives negative points (i.e., −1 point) for the time component 
of the answer, (2) if the difference between a user’s answer and the true time is less than 
tmin (e.g., 1 h), the answer is considered to be correct and the user receives full point (i.e., 
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1 point), and (3) if the difference between a user’s answer and the true time is less than 
tmax and greater than tmin, the user receives partial points depending on how close the 
answer is to the true time (i.e., correct answer). The closer the selected time to the true 
time, the higher the awarded points will be.
Note that wt and wo can be adjusted to give higher weights to different parts of the 
answer, and tmin and tmax can be adjusted to allow different fidelity for the time window. 
For instance, if wt > wo, more weight is given to the time component of the answer. In 
our evaluation, for activity and battery charging questions, we set wo = 0.2 and wt = 0.80 
where 
∑
wo + wt = 1, tmin = 60 min and tmax = 120 min, meaning that if the differ-
ence between a user’s answer and the true time is smaller than tmin (e.g., 1 h), the user’s 
answer is considered to be correct, and if the differences is within the range of tmin and 





  • nqac: number of selected options for which the answer is correct for a question q.
  • wo: weight for the event type component of the answer
  • wt: weight for the time component of the answer
  • tdiff : time differences between the selected answer and the correct time(s)
  • tmin: minimum allowed time difference
  • tmax: maximum allowed time difference
  • ti,correct: time of the correct answer for a question
  • ti,selected: selected time for a question
Model‑based authentication
As different users often differ in terms of mental ability to recall past events, they are 
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we leverage users’ historical performance and response patterns in addition to accuracy 
score to authenticate users. Specifically, we evaluate a Bayesian classifier based authen-
tication algorithm and compare the performance against a simple threshold based 
scheme. They are presented below in increasing order of complexity.
Threshold based scheme
As a single question may not be enough for reliably authenticating a user, we assume 
that multiple questions may be asked in a single session. Hence, in this scheme, we cal-
culate the score of a user by calculating the average accuracy over multiple challenge 
questions. As a user may answer only a subset of questions correctly, ideally, it should be 
possible for someone to get access even with less than perfect score. To accommodate 
imperfect score, in our system, we calculate the authentication rate of legitimate users 
using a global threshold based scheme, where a user is identified as a legitimate user if 
his/her score is greater than some predefined threshold δ. We vary the value of δ from 
100 to 0 % in our study.
While the threshold based scheme is easy to understand and apply, as each individ-
ual user is different and may perform differently, the threshold based scheme performs 
poorly (see "Classification accuracy of threshold based scheme" section). To address this, 
we attempt to account for this variations by building Bayesian classifier based models for 
each user based on individual response patterns, which is described next.
Bayesian based classifier for authentication
To account for variations in individual response patterns and accuracy, instead of relying 
solely on user’s accuracy score and expecting the user to answer all questions correctly, 
the system learns a user’s response pattern, and subsequently leverages the response pat-
terns along with accuracy score to authenticate the user. For example, a user who usually 
answers call questions correctly but SMS questions incorrectly would be more likely to 
answer call questions correctly and SMS questions incorrectly in future attempts (i.e., 
repeat a similar pattern). Using this scheme, even if an adversary somehow can observe 
and learn a user’s daily activities and answers all the questions correctly, the adversary 
will require to closely imitate the response errors and behavior of a legitimate user to 
gain access to the system (e.g., time takes to answer).
To this end, in our work, we use a Bayesian based classifier which is inspired based 
on prior work [9] that has shown that Bayesian classifier is appropriate to distinguish 
between legitimate and adversarial users with high accuracy, which is a similar context 
to ours (i.e., they evaluated performance of this classifier for similar attack scenarios). 
We also considered several advantages of Bayesian classifiers such as ease of implemen-
tation, speed in training and classification, and the fact that they can be used for real 
time prediction [40–42].
In this model, to predict whether a given response comes from a legitimate user (i.e., 
u) or an adversary (i.e., u′) based on k response features (f1...fk), we create separate mod-
els for each question type for each user. For example, for user 1, we have seven different 
models for seven different question types.
Let’s assume that for each question type Qi, we have n responses (r1, ..., rn) which are 
obtained from n different sessions for a user. Each such response ri can be represented 
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by the response features (f1...fk). Hence, Naïve Bayes Classifier for this case can be writ-
ten as follows for each question type Qi and for each response ri:
where P(u|f1...fk) (i.e., posterior(u)) is the probability of being a legitimate user based on 
the response features. P(u) is the prior probability distribution of the legitimate user. 
We assume that the chance of being a legitimate user is 50 % (i.e., equal probability), so 
P(u) = P(u′) = 0.5. P(f1...fk |u) represents the joint probability of responses given a user 
is legitimate. Since fi’s are independent (based on our assumption), P(f1...fk |u) can be 
rewritten as the product of the component probabilities as follows:
The denominator P(f1...fk) of Eq. 5 represents the joint probability of responses’ features. 
This can be expressed as follows:
where P(f1...fk |u′) denotes the probability of being an adversary (i.e., non-user) based on 
the response features.
To evaluate the classification accuracy of this scheme for different users and differ-
ent attack scenarios, we build two models. First, we build one model for each legitimate 
user using the historical data of the user. Second, we build one model that represents the 
community of attackers. Since it would be quite unrealistic to assume that the attacker 
data is known by the system in advance, we use this simple alternative for more real-
istic classifier evaluation of different attack scenarios. More specifically, we train the 
attacker’s model using the community of attackers without assuming known data from 





P(f1...fk |u) = p(f1|u)p(f2|u)...p(fk |u),
P(f1...fk) = P(u)P(f1...fk |u)+ P(u
′)P(f1...fk |u
′),
Data from  Legimate 
and Aacker user pairs 
or each  and a 
queson from a session for tesng 
L is legimate A is aacker 
Test 
Single model for each 
 (excluding ) 
Community Model for Aackers 
(excluding )  
vs Training Legimate Training Adversary 
Fig. 2 Training and test scheme for evaluation of the Bayes classifier. For training, we build 2 models: (1) a 
model for each legitimate user, (2) a community model for attackers excluding the corresponding legitimate 
user’s attacker data. Since it is unrealistic to assume that attackers’ data is known in advance by the system, 
we use this scheme for more realistic evaluation of the classifier
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attacker user pair’s response data into k folds where k denotes the number of sessions. 
Subsequently, we use data from (k − 1) sessions to train the model and use the remain-
ing session for testing. We repeat the process k times where each time we use a different 
session for testing. To test the system, we try three different attack scenarios (against 
strong adversaries, against naive adversaries, and against the community of both strong 
and naive adversaries) as follows.
In the first case, we assume the existence of only strong adversaries in the system (i.e., 
all attackers are strong adversaries). In this case, the classifier is trained on data from the 
legitimate user and the community of all strong adversaries excluding the correspond-
ing legitimate user’s strong adversary as shown in Fig. 2. Once the model is constructed, 
the test dataset from the legitimate user and the corresponding legitimate user’s strong 
adversary is used to assess the classification accuracy of the system against unknown 
strong adversary without assuming known data from an individual attacker. In the 
second case, we assume the existence of only naive adversaries in the system (i.e., all 
attackers are naive adversaries who are trying to compromise the system without any 
knowledge regarding the daily routines of the targeted user). In this case, the classifier is 
trained on data from the legitimate user and community of all naive adversaries exclud-
ing the corresponding legitimate user’s naive adversary. As before, the test dataset con-
sists of legitimate user’s data and his/her naive adversary data. Finally, in the third case, 
we do not distinguish between naive and strong adversaries and the classifier is trained 
using data from the community of strong and naive adversaries in the system. Again, we 
exclude the corresponding legitimate user’s strong and naive adversaries’ data from the 
training dataset.
Study design
To evaluate the security and usability of the dynamic security question mechanism, we 
recruited 24 participants from a college campus through the university email list server.
To simulate strong adversaries, we recruited participants in pairs (e.g., close friends, 
significant others). The social relationships between the pairs of participants are as fol-
lows. Four participants brought their significant other, and eight participants brought 
their close friends. We also asked participants to rate how well they know each other on 
a Likert-scale of 1 (Very little) to 5 (Pretty well). A majority of the participants reported 
that they knew the partner pretty well (median = 5, mode = 5 and mean = 4.6).
Over the course of the experiments, each participant was presented with three sets 
of questions multiple times each week. The first set of question was generated based on 
participant’s own data. For example, a participant would receive a phone call question 
in the following format: “who did you call at 11:25 am on Wednesday?”. The second set 
of question was generated based on participant’s pair’s (e.g., close friend) data. In this 
case, the role of a strong adversary is played by the pair of each participant. For example, 
the participant would receive a phone call question about his/her partner in the follow-
ing format: “who did your partner call at 4:20 pm on Friday?”. The third set of question 
was generated based on a randomly selected participant’s data whose identity was not 
revealed to the participant who answered the questions. In this case, participants played 
the role of a naive adversary. For example, the participant would receive a phone call 
question about a stranger in the following format: “who did a stranger call at 2:51 pm on 
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Monday?”. In all cases, participants were not given any feedback regarding his/her per-
formance throughout the study to avoid biasing them. Moreover, while participants were 
attempting to answer the challenge questions generated based on their close friend’s data 
or a random user’s data (i.e., playing the role of an adversary), the exact same questions 
and the exact same possible answer options (if a question has multiple answer choices 
such as app question—Fig.  1c) that were presented to the legitimate user are presented 
to the adversarial users. Each participant was compensated with a $25 Amazon gift card 
for two weeks of participation. The study was approved by the University’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB).
Evaluation
During a period of 30 days, we collected a total number of 7672 valid question-answer 
responses from 24 participants (24 legitimate users, 24 strong adversarial users and 24 
naive adversarial users). Table  5 lists the breakdown of the number of responses col-
lected for seven different question types and three user types (i.e., legitimate, strong and 
naive adversarial users). Out of 7672 responses, 2865 responses were from legitimate 
users, 2553 responses were from strong adversarial users, and 2254 responses were from 
naive adversarial users. One of the participants withdrew from the study after two weeks 
of participation. All participants (10 female, 14 male) were undergraduate students from 
a broad range of degree programs (e.g., psychology, material science and engineering). 
The age of participants ranged from 18 to 23 years with an average age of 19.33 years 
(Median = 19 and SD = 1.28). The key findings are discussed below.
Descriptive statistics for collected data
We collected smartphone usage data including call logs, SMS logs, location logs, appli-
cation usage logs, music play list history, physical activity logs, and battery charging logs 
from 24 participants for over a month.
Figure  3a shows the statistics for phone call data including outgoing and incoming 
phone calls. The histogram plot appears to be right-skewed as most of the participants 
(∼80 %) made 1–4 phone calls on average per day during the study period (i.e., 1 month).
Figure 3b shows the statistics for SMS data including the number of sent and received 
text messages. The histogram for the SMS data appears to be right-skewed as most of 
the participants (∼90 %) sent and received 50–100 SMS messages on average per day. 
Table 5 Number of question-answer responses collected for each question and user type
Question type Number of response collected
Legitimate Strong Naive
Call 288 267 235
SMS 523 488 406
Location 480 452 388
Activity 347 289 271
Battery 416 346 313
App 437 349 308
Music 374 362 333
Total 2865 2553 2254
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Although one of the participants received and sent 150–200 SMS on average per day and 
another participant received and sent 350–400 SMS messages on average per day. It is 
worth noting that the number of SMS messages sent/received is relatively higher than 
the number phone calls made/received. This indicates that our participants, who were 
college students, preferred text-messaging service over phone calls. This may be because 
texting is quicker and more convenient in many situations (e.g., loud environment) and 
texting rates are generally cheaper than calling rates.
Figure 3c shows the average number of applications used by a participant per day dur-
ing the study period. The histogram appears to be centered. All of the participants used 
on average at least five different apps per day and most of them used 15–20 different 
apps on average per day. Figure 3d shows that most of the participants listened to 1–15 
songs on average per day while two of the participants listened to as many as around 
45 songs on average per day. Here, we only considered music that is listened to more 
than 30 s. Figure 3e shows the statistics for physical activity data. We found that most 
of the participants (∼90 %) did not perform either running or bicycling, while many (∼
80 %) walked and rode a vehicle between 2–6 times on average per day. Here, we only 
considered activities that had duration of more than 3 min. Figure 3f shows the statistics 
for battery charging events. We found that most of the participants (15) charged their 
phones on average once/day, 5 of the participants twice/day, 2 of them more than twice/
day and 2 of them every other day. Figure  3g shows the number of distinct locations 
visited per day by participants during the study period. The histogram shows that most 
of the participants visited 2–6 unique locations on average per day. Intuitively, as users 
send/receive a lot of SMS messages, we expected that SMS related questions will be 
harder to answer compared to questions that are based on other data types (e.g., phone 
call, application usage, music, physical activity, battery charging, and location). Further-
more, as a user needs to specify the time of the events in case of physical activity and 
battery charging related questions, we expected these types of open-ended questions to 
be relatively harder compared to multiple choice application usage and music questions 
where users only need to identify the correct answer(s) from a given list. We expected 
users’ confidence to vary as well across question types. Our findings are below.
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Fig. 3 Histograms of average number of phone calls (a), SMS (b), application used (c), songs listened to (d), 
activity performed (e), battery charging events (f) and distinct locations (g) per day across all users
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Accuracy scores
Table  6 shows average accuracy scores across different question types and user types. 
For legitimate users, the accuracy score of call, SMS, location, app, music, activity and 
battery related questions are 0.76, 0.46, 0.69, 0.55, 0.46, 0.42 and 0.53 respectively. For 
strong adversarial users, the accuracy score of call, SMS, location, app, music, activity 
and battery related questions are 0.13, 0.08, 0.29, −0.03, −0.71, 0.06 and −0.005 respec-
tively. In terms of guesability, naive adversarial users performed much worse than strong 
adversarial users, their accuracy score varied between 0.038 and −1.782. The negative 
accuracy scores for adversarial users mainly stems from the penalization scheme where 
incorrect answers are penalized (i.e., gets negative score)—[recall that score calculations 
are explained in "User score calculation" section (Table 4)]. Please note that, due to the 
different score calculation schemes, score ranges are varied for different question types, 
and thus scores are not comparable. In order to evaluate how well each security ques-
tion work and compare against different security question types, we used ROC curves, 
which is a standard way of comparing performance [43] (see "Accuracy of model-based 
authentication" section). Hence, although the accuracy scores given in Table 6 are not 
comparable, ROC curves shown in Figs. 4 and 5 are comparable across different ques-
tion types and user types.
In summary, legitimate users performed significantly better compared to adversarial 
users in terms of answer correctness. As we expected, strong adversarial users per-
formed better than naive adversarial users, since strong adversarial users have significant 
knowledge regarding legitimate users compared to naive adversarial user. We found that 
it was very difficult for a naive adversary to guess users’ smartphone usage behavior and 
day-to-day activities.
Users’ level of confidence
During the study, after answering a question, users (i.e., both legitimate and adversarial 
users) were asked to rate their level of confidence in their answer on a 5-point Likert scale 
where 1 means “Not confident at all” and 5 means “Very confident”. To analyze the con-
fidence ratings, which may passively indicate whether legitimate users find a particular 
question type easy to recall, or easy to guess in case of adversarial users, we used Kruskal–
Wallis test which is a non-parametric alternative of ANOVA. Since the response data is 
ordinal, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests are more appropriate in this context. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test demonstrated that there were significant differences in confidence 
Table 6 Average accuracy scores for each question and user type
Question type Accuracy score
Legitimate Strong Naive
Call 0.76 0.13 0.008
SMS 0.46 0.08 0.002
Location 0.69 0.29 0.038
App 0.55 −0.03 −0.549
Music 0.46 −0.71 −1.782
Activity 0.42 0.06 −0.240
Battery 0.53 −0.005 −0.157
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ratings of users among the seven types of questions for three different user types, (χ2(6) 
= 60.22, p < 0.01) for legitimate users, (χ2(6) = 27.23, p < 0.01) for strong adversarial 
users, and (χ2(6) = 19.52, p = 0.03) for naive adversarial users. For demonstration pur-
poses in Fig. 6, we provide the distributions (the median and interquartile range (IQR)) of 
confidence ratings among the seven types of questions for three different user types. The 
medians are indicated by the horizontal bold lines for each boxplot. Two whiskers (upper 
and lower) show greatest and least values respectively excluding outliers. Small circles 
shown below lower whiskers (e.g., the first subplot that shows legitimate user’s confidence 
ratings) show outliers, which indicates that these observations are less than 1.5 times of 
lower quartile (i.e., 25 % of data is less than this value). Small circles shown above upper 
whiskers (e.g., the first subplot that shows naive adversarial users’ confidence ratings) 
show outliers, which indicates that these observations are more than 1.5 times of upper 
quartile (i.e., 25 % of data is greater than this value). Also, extreme outliers are marked 
with a star (e.g., the subplot shows call questions confidence rating for naive adversarial 
users).
As shown in this figure, legitimate users were generally confident in their answers 
(medians are 5 for all question types except Music and SMS questions (median: 4)). 
For SMS questions, part of the reason may be because the participants sent/received a 
large number of SMS messages (mean: 69, median: 56), and they may text several people 
within a span of few minutes, making it difficult to recall reliably due to a large volume 
of the events. As listening to music can be a passive activity where users may do it while 
doing other things and/or often listen to whatever plays automatically instead of choos-
ing a specific song each time, users may find it harder to remember and answer music 
questions, which is reflected in their low confidence rating.
When it comes to adversarial users, strong adversarial users appeared to be gener-
ally neutral (median: 3) in their confidence ratings. Confidence ratings of naive adver-
sarial users were generally close to the lowest rating 1. Moreover, for comparison, we 
present the mean rank values (which were obtained from the Kruskal–Wallis test) 
and their rank orders among the seven question types for legitimate and adversarial 
users in Table  7. For each user type, we compare the mean rank values among the 
question types. The question type with the highest mean rank is considered to have 
higher confidence ratings for a user type. Please note that the mean rank values are 
compared by order of magnitude for only comparing question types for a particular 
user type. For instance, application usage questions had the highest confidence rating 
for legitimate users. For strong adversaries, location questions had the highest confi-
dence rating (i.e., strong adversarial users were more confident when guessing loca-
tion questions compared to other six question types) followed by activity questions. 
For naive adversarial users, battery and location questions had the highest confidence 
ratings. Intuitively, these results make sense, since location and activity of legitimate 
users can be observed by their close friends (a close friend may know the routines of 
the target user). On the other hand, adversarial users were less confident when guess-
ing call and SMS questions, as these data types are more personal and hard to guess. 
Moreover, naive adversarial users had higher confidence ratings for location questions, 
which may stem from the fact that they knew that the other participants were from the 
same campus/locality.
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Time taken to answer questions
During the study, we kept track of the amount of time that was taken by a user to answer 
a question. Table  8 shows the descriptive statistics about the time taken for different 
types of users to answer different types of questions. We found that adversarial users 
(i.e., strong and naive adversarial users) generally took less time on average to answer the 
questions compared to legitimate users. Furthermore, we observed that time taken varied 
for question types. For example, the longest time was taken for location questions with 
mean 28.56 s (median: 23 s) for legitimate users. Part of the reason may be due to the fact 
that users had to zoom in at level 16 (at least) to select a location on Google Map. Also, 
text based questions (Call and SMS questions) seemed to take less time than multiple 
choice questions (Application and Music). The mean time for Call and SMS questions are 
15.51 (median: 11) and 17.99 (median: 12), while for application and music questions are 
18.70 (median: 14) and 20.55 (median: 13) s respectively. Moreover, we found the lowest 
mean time for battery questions with mean 14.15 (median: 9, SD: 21:44) s, which was very 
close to the mean time for text based questions (i.e., Call and SMS).
Accuracy of model‑based authentication
As performance metric, ROC (Receiver operating characteristics) plots are commonly 
used for evaluating classification performance, in which TPR (true positives rate) on 
the Y-axis is plotted as a function of FPR (false positives rate) on the X-axis. A ROC 
plot shows the tradeoff between TPR and FPR for all possible thresholds (i.e., cut-off 
points) [44]. In our context, the true positive rate (TPR) corresponds to the success rate 
of legitimate users, while the false positive rate (FPR) denotes the success rate of adver-
saries. We also use the area under the ROC curve (AUC) to measure the accuracy of 
the test. Note that the performance of the test can be quantified with a single value by 
calculating the AUC [43] which is an important indicator of the classification perfor-
mance. AUC = 0.5 represents a test performed at chance for binary classification (i.e., 
the model performs no better than a coin flip), while AUC = 1 means a perfect test 
where all legitimate users succeed and adversaries failed to enter the system. Hence, the 
larger the AUC value, the better the model/test. Please note that, while evaluating per-
formance of both threshold and Bayesian classifier based model, we use AUC value for 
different attack scenarios, question types and vary the number of questions using the 
data collected from our field study.
In this work, we first present the performance of a simple threshold based scheme, and 
next compare that against the performance of a more sophisticated Bayesian classifier 
based model. The details are below.
Classification accuracy of threshold based scheme
We generate ROC curves for the threshold-based scheme to show how the number of 
questions would affect TPR and FPR in identifying users for two different attack scenar-
ios. In particular, in the first scenario, we assume the existence of only strong adversaries 
in the system (i.e., all attackers are strong adversaries), while in the second scenario, we 
assume the existence of only naive adversaries in the system (i.e., all attackers are naive 
adversaries). The three curves in each plot in Figs.  4 and 5 are generated for different 
numbers of questions (n) ranging from 1 to 6 for these two attack scenarios. For brevity, 
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we only show results for n = 1, n = 3, and n = 6 for a given question type and attack sce-
nario. From these figures, it can be seen that, although the performance is better when 
modeled against naive adversaries in Fig. 5 compared to strong adversaries in Fig.  4, the 
performance of threshold based scheme against strong adversaries is not impressive. 
This motivates us to explore the Bayesian classifier based scheme which is explained 
next.
Fig. 4 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves of the threshold based scheme for different types of 
questions when modeled against strong adversaries for n = 1, n = 3, and n = 6 questions respectively
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Accuracy of Bayesian based classifier for authentication
We generated ROC curves (as shown in Figs. 7, 8 and 9) to capture the tradeoff between 
TPR and FPR while using different number of questions answered and different attack 
scenarios modeled. The three curves displayed in each plot in Figs.   7, 8 and 9 are gen-
erated for n = 1, n = 3, and n = 6 for the three attack scenarios, namely, against naive 
adversaries, against strong adversaries, and against both strong and naive adversar-
ies respectively. In these ROC Figures, the AUC value of each test is shown as the 
Fig. 5 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves of the threshold based scheme for different types of 
questions when modeled against naive adversaries for n = 1, n = 3, and n = 6 questions respectively
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performance of the test. We observe that answering more question increases the AUC 
value regardless of the modeled adversary. In other words, the system becomes increas-
ingly confident in identifying legitimate users as the number of questions answered 
within a category increases. For example, the AUC values are 0.88 for n = 1, 0.95 for 
n = 3 and 1.0 for n = 6 when modeled against strong adversary and the AUC values are 
0.96 for n = 1, 0.99 for n = 3 and 1.0 for n = 6 when modeled against naive adversary for 
call question. The four performance measures are summarized in Table 9 where we used 
four performance measures TPR, FPR, Accuracy and F1 score to evaluate performance of 
the Bayesian classifier [45]. For brevity, we only show results for n = 1, n = 3, and n = 6 
Table 7 The ordered “mean rank” of confidence ratings for seven different question types 
for three different user types
The higher the mean rank, the more confident users were in their answers. The mean rank values are designated within 
parenthesis right next to the question types. Please note that the mean rank values are compared by order of magnitude for 
only question types for a particular user type
Order Legitimate Strong Naive
1 App (888) Location (857) Battery (778)
2 Activity (880) Activity (833) Location (747)
3 Location (848) App (830) App (734)
4 Battery (805) Music (802) Activity (717)
5 Call (801) Battery (793) Music (702)
6 Music (776) SMS (725) SMS (672)




















































Fig. 6 Legitimate and adversarial users’ confidence ratings for seven different question types. During the 
study, with every question answered, all users were asked to rate their level of confidence in their answer on a 
scale of 1 (Not confident at all) to 5 (Very Confident)
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for a given question type and attack scenario. From Table 9, it can be seen that regard-
less of the modeled adversary, legitimate users were able to obtain high accuracies after 
answering more questions. In particular, for all question types, as the value of n increases 
from 1 to 6, TPR, F1 score and accuracy rate increase for legitimate users. Also, we see 
that the classification performance varied greatly depending on the modeled adversary. 
For example, for n = 3 and when modeled against strong adversary, the average accuracy 
rates are 96.0 % for call questions, 94.1 % for SMS questions, 96.3 % for location ques-
tions, 97.1 % for app questions, 96.8 % for music questions, 98.0 % for activity questions 
and 95.9 % for battery questions. On the other hand, when modeled against strong adver-
sary and n = 3, the average accuracy rates are slightly lower–93.1 % for call questions, 
86.8 % for SMS questions, 85.8 % for location questions, 93.4 % for app questions, 85.9 % 
for music questions, 86.8 % for activity questions and 93.6 % for battery questions. Intui-
tively, since a strong adversary has significant knowledge regarding a user’s schedule (e.g., 
girlfriend), strong adversarial users are more likely to gain access to the system by answer-
ing questions more accurately compared to naive adversarial users. Furthermore, among 
the question types, phone call, app usage, and battery charging questions generally per-
form better compared to SMS, location, activity, and music questions.
User’s opinions regarding autobiographical authentication
To gain insight into the perceived usability and security of smartphone based autobio-
graphical authentication systems, at the end of the study, the participants were asked 
to complete an exit survey for an additional $10 Amazon Gift card. We asked the par-
ticipants to rate several statements on a five-point Likert-scale where 1 indicates strong 
disagreement and 5 indicates strong agreement with a given statement.
Table  10 summarizes the survey result. As the survey responses are ordinal data, 
we report median and mode rather than mean and standard deviation for each ques-
tion response. Also, in case where multiple modes exist, the smallest value is shown in 
Table 10. Our key findings are below.
First, most of the participants found phone call, location, app, music, and bat-
tery charging based questions to be relatively easier to recall (mode 4 median 4, mode 
5 median 4, mode 4 median 4, mode 5 median 4 and mode 5 median 4 respectively) 
Table 8 Time taken for legitimate and adversarial users to answer different types of ques-
tions
The time unit is in seconds
Legitimate Strong Naive
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Activity 18.11 13 17.15 13.96 9 15.47 8.45 6 9.95
Battery 14.15 9 21.44 10.42 7 11.47 7.00 4 7.41
App 18.70 14 14.43 18.68 14 17.16 14.75 12 11.00
Music 20.55 13 28.88 25.79 17 31.77 13.73 9 21.96
Call 15.51 11 13.20 7.53 5 9.52 6.96 5 7.26
SMS 17.99 12 17.88 7.88 5 9.91 7.34 5 7.57
Location 28.56 23 19.05 18.79 15 12.98 14.94 11 11.05
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compared to SMS and Activity based questions (mode 4 median 3.5 and mode 3 median 
3 respectively), as expected.
Second, when it comes to guessability, most of the participants disagreed that guessing 
the answers of their close friend’s question were easy. Also, majority of the participants 
strongly agreed that a stranger will not be able to guess answers to their questions easily.
Finally, based on our exit survey, users were found to be generally positive about the 
idea of answering dynamic security questions for fallback authentication instead of static 
Fig. 7 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves of the Bayesian classifier based scheme for different 
types of questions when modeled against naive adversaries for n = 1, n = 3, and n = 6 questions respectively
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security questions. Specifically, in response to the question “would you consider using 
this system as a replacement of existing systems?”, majority of the participants men-
tioned advantages of such systems over existing static challenge based systems. Some of 
the sample responses are below.
Fig. 8 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves of the Bayesian classifier based scheme for different 
types of questions when modeled against strong adversaries for n = 1, n = 3, and n = 6 questions respec-
tively
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Fig. 9 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves of the Bayesian classifier based scheme for different 
types of questions when modeled against strong and naive adversaries for n = 1, n = 3, and n = 6 questions 
respectively
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“- Yes, I think this is a very good system because I always have trouble resetting my 
password because I try to use different questions on different website so that if I 
get hacked, it’s only that one website that gets hacked, and therefore I have trouble 
remembering the answers that I put for the questions. This proved to be very easy to 
guess my own questions but very difficult to answer questions about my pair and 
about a stranger, therefore I would feel very comfortable and protected using this 
system to protect my accounts.”
“- Yes, I think that this system could potentially be much more secure than existing 
systems, as it would require either a very constant update on my behavior to suc-
cessfully guess or a very thorough understanding of my daily habits, both of which I 
feel would be more difficult to easily identify than a single piece of information.”
“- I would use this system to replace the old one. It is probably more secure than 
what is used now and does not require memorization. It seems easy to use and ...”
“-A personal anecdote: my ex-boyfriend knew all of my passwords while we were 
in a relationship and of course a lot of personal information (i.e., mother’s maiden 
name, pet’s name, etc), but when we broke up, he still had all of this information and 
could easily hack my accounts, so I had to go to ALL of my accounts and change the 
passwords. On the other hand, in the case of this system, he might be able to guess at 
my cell phone activities while we are together (not all, but most information). BUT, 
once the relationship is over, my cell phone usage would be significantly harder to 
guess for him as my activities and habits change much faster than personal ques-
tions such as pet name.”
Despite the positive feedback, there were a few participants expressed their concerns 
regarding the usability aspects of the system. Some sample responses are below.
“-Sometimes it is hard for me to recall sms and call logs because I text so many dif-
ferent people.”
“-Who you text/call, what apps you use and what music you listen to, it all changes 
a lot quite frequently in my life. So while probably way more secure, I would be wor-
ried that I would lock myself out of my accounts a lot.”
Discussion and limitations of the study
In our study, we investigated the strengths, weaknesses, and usability aspects of different 
types of dynamic security questions. Our findings suggest that, while the raw accuracy 
varies for different question types, the model-based accuracy of the presented system 
exceeds the accuracy of static challenge question based systems significantly, and is also 
harder to compromise by adversarial users (e.g., low guessability) [4, 7, 8, 14].
However, while our study presents interesting findings, we would like to point out 
that all of the participants in our study were undergraduate students with age between 
18 and 23 years. Thus, further studies are needed to investigate the difference between 
different types of user groups. Also, while the Bayesian classifier based model achieves 
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high accuracy, the model requires training data for both legitimate and adversarial users, 
which may not be always available in real-life. However, as we have shown in "Bayesian 
based classifier for authentication" section, one possible way to address this limitation is 
to train the model using a group of adversarial users’ data that do not include any spe-
cific adversary, which is more likely to be available. For the requirement of training data 
from legitimate users, one may incrementally train the model by asking training ques-
tions and switch from training mode to prediction mode over time once the desired level 
of classification accuracy is achieved  [46]. Other machine learning techniques such as 
SVM and feature extraction algorithms may be explored as well to improve the accuracy 
of the system.
Furthermore, based on our study, we identified several concerns that should be kept 
in mind while designing such systems. For instance, a hostile friend, who called/tex-
ted the target recently, may take advantage of this information to comprise the target’s 
account if the authentication session consists solely of call and SMS based questions. 
Therefore, asking multiple and different types of dynamic security questions is essential 
to enhance the strength and security of such system. Also, as different kinds of informa-
tion on the smartphone involves varying levels of sensitivity (e.g., contact names vs. list 
of app installed), poorly designed dynamic security question can reveal a user’s privacy 
sensitive information over multiple iterations. For example, if phone call or SMS based 
questions are presented in multiple choice format, privacy sensitive information such as 
a user’s contact names can be revealed/exposed to others through that question. Thus, 
when designing dynamic security questions, each data type should be evaluated thor-
oughly to ensure privacy. Finally, in our study, while most users who exhibit high smart-
phone usage behavior for all data types, some users may exhibit low smartphone usage 
behavior, making it harder to generate certain question types.
Despite these limitations, we would like to emphasize that the presented dynamic 
security question mechanism offers several advantages over static challenge question 
based system. For instance, in such system, users do not have to configure questions a 
priori. Also, unlike static security questions where many questions are often inapplicable 
for certain users (e.g., name of your first pet), questions in the presented system are cus-
tomized for each user individually, making it harder to guess by mining online content.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented the design and evaluation of dynamic security questions that 
are generated based on users’ smartphone usage behavior and day-to-day activities cap-
tured by smartphones. Our findings suggest that the style of challenge questions and 
answer format can have a significant effect on user performance. Furthermore, while 
the performance of legitimate users turned out to vary across question types, a Bayesian 
based classifier can distinguish between legitimate and adversarial users with high accu-
racy. Finally, based on our exit survey, users were found to be positive in general towards 
the idea of using dynamic security questions for fallback authentication instead of static 
security questions.
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